If the agent's preference relation satisfies a strict monotonicity condition in common agency under the asymmetric information, the set of all equilibrium allocations in the menu game where menus of contracts are allowed coincides with the set of all equilibrium allocations in the single contract game where only single contracts are allowed.
Introduction
In common agency problems, competing principals try to control a privately-informed agent's choice. Each principal may offer a single incentive contract that specifies the principal's action as a function of the part of the agent's choice that is contractible by the principal. For example, each principal may specify how much the agent needs to pay for each bundle of goods she buys from the principal or how much the principal will pay the agent as a function of the effort the agent exerts on the principal's tasks and etc.
Alternatively, and more generally, each principal may offer a menu of contracts and let the agent pick one of the contracts and then choose her effort. Theorems 1 and 3 in Peters (2003) showed that if the "no-externalities" condition is satisfied, then, under the complete information, the set of pure-strategy equilibrium payoffs in the menu game in which menus of contracts are allowed coincides with the set of pure-strategy equilibrium payoffs in the single contract game in which each principal is allowed to offer only a single contract (i.e., take-itor-leave it offer without negotiation). The "no externalities" condition (Peters 2003 (Peters , 2007 is satisfied if (i) each principal's utility only depends on his own action and the agent's effort and type, and (ii) conditional on the part of the agent's effort that principal j can contract on, the agent has a weak preference ordering over principal j's actions that is independent of her payoff type, the part of her effort that principal j cannot contract on, and the other principals' actions.
Peters and Troncoso Valverde (2009) pointed out that the role of mixed strategies has been widely recognized in the literature on common agency and hence it is important to deal with randomization. For example, a seller (principal) may use a mixed-strategy for his trading mechanism offer in order to conceal his mechanism from competing sellers. In this case, competing sellers cannot know the seller's terms of trade if they ask agents only about their payoff types.
We extend the result in Peters (2003 Peters ( , 2007 to all equilibria including mixed-strategy equilibria in the asymmetric information case in which the agent's payoff type is her own private information. For this purpose, we introduce the condition for the agent's preferences; strict monotonicity over each principal's actions. This condition is satisfied if, conditional on the part of the agent's effort that principal j can contract on, the agent has a strict preference ordering over principal j's actions that is independent of her payoff type, the part of her effort that principal j cannot contract on, and the other principals' actions. Therefore, it is a stronger form of the second part in the "no-externalities" condition but it is not nested into the "no-externalities" condition because the first part is not required.
Formally, we show that the strict monotonicity for the agent's preferences alone ensures that under the asymmetric information, the set of all equilibrium allocations in the menu game coincides with the set of all equilibrium allocations in the single contract game. As the result in Peters holds for both public common agency and private common agency, the result is also established for both public common agency and private common agency.
1
Both the second part in the "no-externalities" condition and our strict monotonicity are satisfied in most cases where each principal's action is monetary transfer between him and the agent and they do not require the quasilinearity or additive separability. Later we highlight the relationship between the "no-externalities" condition and the strict monotonicity of the agent's preferences over each principal's actions and explain why the first part of the "noexternalities" condition is not needed.
Model
Let us explain the general structure for common agency models. There are a set of principals, J ≡ {1, · · · , J}, and a single agent. The agent has private information about her preferences. This information is parameterized by an element, called a (payoff) type, in a set Ω. Principals do not know the true type but they share a common prior belief that the agent's type follows a probability distribution F on Ω. Therefore, there is the asymmetric information on the agent's type. The agent can take an effort e from a set E. Each principal j can take an action y j from a set Y j . We assume that the sets E and Y j are both compact metric spaces. If the agent of type ω takes an effort e and the array of actions that principals take is (y 1 , . . . , y J ), the agent's payoff is u(y 1 , . . . , y J , e, ω) ∈ R and principal j's payoff is v j (y 1 , . . . , y J , e, ω) ∈ R.
An incentive contract a j : E → Y j that principal j offers to the agent specifies his action as a function of the part of the agent's effort that is contractible between them. Following Peters (2003) , let E j be a collection of measurable equivalence classes, whose union is E such that principal j is constrained to respond to each effort in the same equivalence class the same way. It implies that, for any incentive function a j , a j (e) = a j (e ) if e and e belongs to the same equivalence class, sayê: i.e., e, e ∈ê.
The set of feasible incentive contracts for principal j is therefore defined as A j ≡ {a j ∈ A j : a j is E j -measurable}. A j differs in the part of the agent's effort that is contractible between principal j and the agent. Let A ≡ × J k=1 A k . In public common agency (e.g. lobbying), principal j (lobbyist) can make his action contingent on the whole effort (policy) taken by the agent (policy maker). In this case, each effort e is an equivalence class and any equivalence class is a singleton. In private common agency (e.g., private good trading), an effort e chosen by the agent (buyer) is decomposed into J components, e = [e 1 , . . . , e J ], and principal j (seller) can make his action (monetary transfer) contingent on only the jth component (quantity or quality), e j , of the agent action. In this case, an equivalence class is the set of the agent's efforts that have the same jth component and it makes an incentive contract a j effectively specify principal j's action only conditional on e j .
Principals compete with each other by offering the agent menus of incentive contracts. A menu for principal j is a mapping γ j :
The interpretation is that the agent can name the incentive contract that she wants and if it belongs to the menu γ j gets it. A principal may offer a more complex mechanism in which the incentive contract is determined by the agent's message. However, there is no loss of generality to focus on menus in common agency due to Peters (2001) because the set of all equilibrium payoffs in the complex mechanism game is the same as the set of all equilibrium payoffs in the menu game. Let Γ * j be the set of all menus available for principal j. and Γ * ≡ × J k=1 Γ * k . The menu game in common agency starts when each principal j simultaneously offers a menu from Γ * j . After seeing a profile of menus γ = [γ 1 , · · · , γ I ] ∈ Γ * , the agent names an incentive contract for each principal and takes her effort from E. The agent's effort then determines principals' actions given the incentive functions that the agent gets. Finally, payoffs are realized. The agent's continuation strategy is a mapping c : Γ * × Ω → ∆(A × E). The continuation strategy c * constitutes a continuation equilibrium if the randomization c * (γ, ω) maximizes the agent's payoff
where γ j (a j ) is the incentive contract that agent i gets when she names the contract a j and γ j (a j )(e) is principal j's action conditional on the contractible part of the effort e that the agent chooses. Then, the continuation equilibrium c * specifies the normal form game for principals in which each principal j's expected payoff function is, for all γ ∈ Γ * 
Main Result
In the single contract game, each principal j is only allowed to offer an incentive contract in A j . Given an array of incentive contracts offered by principals, the agent simply makes her effort choice. An incentive contract a j can be interested as a degenerate menu because it is equivalent to the menu γ j with a j = γ j (a j ) for all a j . Because the set of degenerate menus is a strict subset of Γ * j , the single contract game restricts the principal's strategy space. It raises two concerns for the single contract game. First, the equilibrium in the single contract game may disappear once a principal is allowed to offer non-degenerate menus. Second, the single contract game may not generate all equilibrium allocations that could have been generated by the menu game.
Theorem 1 in Peters (2003) shows that under the complete information, any pure-strategy equilibrium in the single contract game continues to be an equilibrium in the menu game. Theorem 3 in Peters (2003) states as follows. Suppose that the "no-externalities" condition holds. Then, under the complete information, payoffs associated with any pure-strategy equilibrium in the menu game are supported by a pure-strategy equilibrium in the single contract game. Therefore, the theorems imply that the "no-externalities" condition ensures that under the complete information, the set of pure-strategy equilibria in the single-contract game coincides with the set of pure-strategy equilibria. The "no-externalities" condition in Peters (2003 Peters ( , 2007 ) is stated as follows:
, and all ω ∈ Ω v j (y 1 , . . . , y J , e, ω) =v j (y j , e, ω)
is the same for all (y −j , e, ω) ∈ Y −j ×ê × Ω.
Property D1 states that principal j's payoff is independent of the actions chosen by the other principals. Property D2 states that conditional on the part of the agent's effort that principal j can contract on, the agent has a weak preference ordering over principal j's actions that is independent of her payoff type, the part of her effort that principal j cannot contract on, and the other principals' actions. Peters (2003) showed that the agent's weak preference ordering alone is not sufficient in order to ensure that no additional (purestrategy) equilibrium can be emerged if principals are allowed to offer menus. Let us take his example under the complete information where the agent has no effort and each of two principals has choices between two actions; {a 1 , b 1 } for principal 1 and {a 2 , b 2 } for principal 2.
2 The tuple of three numbers in the cell below indicates payoffs for principal 1, principal 2 and the agent respectively.
a
There is a unique (pure-strategy) equilibrium when each principal i is restricted to offer a i or b i but not the menu of {a i , b i }. In the unique equilibrium, principal 1 offers b 1 and principal 2 offers b 2 . If we expand the game so that each principal can offer the menu of two actions, then we have a continuum of new equilibria. Suppose that each principal i offers the menu of {a i , b i }. Then the agent may randomize with probability q between the two off diagonal outcomes when she makes her choice from the menus. This supports payoffs for principals anywhere between 1 and 2. If principal i deviates to a i , then the agent chooses a j from the other principal's menu and principal i's payoff is zero. If principal i deviates to b i , then the agent chooses a j to induce the payoff of one for principal i.
Let us perturb the payoff slightly with a small ε > 0 as follows:
In this case, the agent has a strict preference ordering over each principal's actions that is independent of the other principal's action: The agent strictly prefers a 1 to b 1 regardless of principal 2's action and she also strictly prefers a 2 to b 2 regardless of principal 1's action. Therefore, if principal i offers the menu of {a i , b i }, the agent will always choose a i regardless of the other principal's action. Therefore, b i in the menu {a i , b i } will be never chosen in any continuation equilibrium and, even without property D1, there is no additional equilibrium in the menu game that cannot be generated by a take-it-or-leave-it-offer game. This intuition can be extended to the case with the agent's effort under the asymmetric information. For this purpose, we define the strict monotonicity of the agent's preferences in each principal's action. In words, the agent's preferences are strictly monotone if, conditional on the part of the agent's effort that principal j can contract on, the agent has a strict preference ordering over principal j's actions that is independent of her payoff type, the part of her effort that principal j cannot contract on, and the other principals' actions:
Definition 1 The agent's preferences are strictly monotone in each principal's action if, for each j ∈ J , each equivalence classê ∈ E j , and each compact subset B * j ⊂ Y j , y j ∈ B * j : u(y j , y −j , e, ω) > u(y j , y −j , e, ω) for all y j ∈ B * j with y j = y j (2)
The only difference between property D2 in the "no-externalities" condition and our strict monotonicity is that the weak inequality in (1) is replaced with the strict inequality as shown in (2) . All the examples for the agent's preferences in Peters (2003) that satisfy property D2 also satisfy our strict monotonicity: Both property D2 and the strict monotonicity (a stronger version of D2) are satisfied in most cases where each principal j's action is monetary transfer between him and the agent. For example, assume that the agent is the buyer who buys goods from two sellers (principals) and her utility function is
where e j is the quantity of the good that the buyer buys from seller j and y j is the transfer to seller j. Seller j receives transfer only conditional on the quantity of the good e j that he sells to the buyer, so, for each e j , the equivalence class is {(e j , e i ) : e i ∈ R + }. Because, conditional on each e j , the buyer strictly prefers a less transfer to seller j regardless of e i , y i , and ω, the strict monotonicity is satisfied for the agent's preferences. Both property D2 in the "no-externalities" condition and our strict monotonicity do not require the quasilinearity or the separability and genericity in Attar et al. (2008) . Attar et al. (2008) showed that if the separability and genericity are satisfied for the agent's preferences, then the set of all equilibrium allocations in complex mechanisms is the set of all equilibrium allocations in standard direct mechanisms in the environment with finite action space. Their separability requires that the agent has the strict preference ordering over each principal's action y j that is independent of her whole effort e and the other principals' actions y −j .
Formally the separability in Attar et al. (2008) requires that if the agent of type ω strictly prefers y j to y j given (y −j , e), then she also strictly prefers y j to y j given any other (y −j , e ). The genericity requires that given any (y j , ω) ∈ Y j × Ω, u(y j , y −j , e, ω) = u(y j , y −j , e , ω) for any (y −j , e), (y −j , e ) ∈ Y −j × E. The separability in Attar et al. (2008) is not weaker nor stronger than property D2 of the "no-externalities" condition and the strict monotonicity in our paper 3 , but Pavan and Calzolari (2010) showed that the separability is restrictive in most common agency problems involving monetary transfer. One advantage of property D2 in the "no-externalities" condition and our strict monotonicity (a stronger version of D2) is that they are satisfied in most cases where each principal's action is monetary transfer.
With the strict monotonicity, we extend the results in Peters (2003) for all equilibrium allocations under the asymmetric information as follows.
Theorem 1 Suppose that the agent's preferences are strictly monotone in each principal's action. Then, under the asymmetric information, the set of all equilibrium allocations relative to the single contract game is the same as the set of all equilibrium allocations in the menu game.
Note that Theorem 1 is established by assuming that for each principal j, the sets of feasible contracts in the single contract game and the menu games are all A j and it is E jmeasurable. Because A j is E j -measurable, in public common agency it includes all incentive contracts that specify principal j's action conditional on the agent's effort e as a whole. In private common agency, principal j can specify his action conditional only on the jth component e j of the agent's effort. Therefore, the E j -measurable A j includes only those incentive contracts that effectively specify principal j's action conditional on e j only. Therefore, as the result in Peters (2003) holds for both public common agency and private common agency, Theorem 1 is also established for both public common agency and private common agency. Appendix includes omitted technical details including the proof of Theorem 1.
APPENDIX
We first develop a few notations for the proof of Theorem 1. For any j ∈ J , any γ j ∈ Γ * j , and anyê ∈ E j define B j (ê, γ j ) as B j (ê, γ j ) ≡ {y j ∈ Y j : y j = γ j (a j )(e) for all a j ∈ A j and any e ∈ê}.
γ j (a j ) is the incentive function that principal j assigns when the agent names the incentive contract a j so that B j (ê, γ j ) is the set of principal j's actions that the agent can induce when she takes any effort e in an equivalence classê. For all j ∈ J , all γ j ∈ Γ * j , and all e ∈ E, let ψ j (γ j )(e) ≡ arg max
be principal j's action that maximizes the agent's payoff among all actions in B j (ê, γ j ) when she takes e, whereê in (5) is the equivalence class that satisfies e ∈ê. When the agent's preference relation is strictly monotone in each principal's action, ψ j (γ j )(e) is a singleton for all e ∈ E so that ψ j (γ j ) itself becomes an incentive contract that specifies principal j's action as a function of the part of the agent's effort that he can contract on. For technical simplicity, we assume that ψ j (γ j )(e) is non-empty for all j ∈ J , all e ∈ E, and all γ j ∈ Γ * j Lemma 1 Suppose that the agent's preference relation is strictly monotone in each principal's action. For any continuation equilibrium c * relative to Γ * , let c * a (e, γ, ω) denote the probability distribution over any array of incentive contracts conditional on (e, γ, ω) ∈ E ×Γ * ×Ω. Then any (a 1 , . . . , a J ) in the support of c * a (e, γ, ω) satisfies γ j (a j )(e) = ψ j (γ j )(e) (6) for all (e, γ, ω) ∈ E × Γ * × Ω and all j ∈ J .
Proof. Let γ = [γ 1 , . . . , γ J ] be the profile of menus that principals offer. Given a continuation equilibrium c * relative to Γ * , let c * a j (e, γ, ω) be the marginal probability distribution on A j conditional on (e, γ, ω). Suppose that the agent's preference relation is strictly monotone in each principal's action. Given γ j , the set of principal j's actions, B j (ê, γ j ) defined in (4) , that the agent can induce depends on effort e that she takes because e subsequently determinesê. Once B j (ê, γ j ) is determined, the agent will always choose a message that leads to ψ j (γ j )(e) ∈ B j (ê, γ j ) because of the strict monotonicity of the agent's preference relation. It implies that given e and γ j , any a j in the support of c * a j (e, γ j , γ −j , ω) must satisfy (6) regardless of γ −j and ω. Therefore, any (a 1 , . . . , a J ) in the support of c * a j (e, γ, ω) satisfies (6) for all (e, γ, ω) ∈ E × Γ * × Ω and all j ∈ J .
Proof of Theorem 1.
First start with an equilibrium [δ Any e in the support of b e (D(a), ω) satisfies (8) because the joint probability distribution b(D(a), ω) is derived from the continuation equilibrium c * relative to Γ * . Therefore, (7) implies thatc is a continuation equilibrium relative to A.
We only need to show thatσ j is a best response for principal j givenσ −j relative to A. Consider each principal j's payoff. For any (a j , a −j ) ∈ A, let
First, consider any a j ∈ suppσ j . The construction ofσ j implies that
Second, consider anyâ j / ∈ suppσ j . Then ψ j (â j ), δ * −j , c * ). Therefore, (10) and (11) imply thatσ j is a best response for principal j when the other principals useσ −j given a continuation equilibriumc. Therefore, [σ 1 , . . . ,σ J ,c] is an equilibrium relative to A. Now start with an equilibrium [σ 1 , . . . ,σ J ,c] relative to A. Letπ : Ω → ∆(E × Y ) be the social choice function that is supported by [σ 1 , . . . ,σ J ,c]. Note that any incentive function a k can be viewed as a degenerate menu γ k that assigns a k regardless of the menu that the agent names. For principal j's deviation to mechanisms in Γ * j , one can associate c , due to by Lemma 1, with a continuation equilibrium strategy c : Γ * j × A −j × Ω → ∆(A j × X) relative to Γ * j × A −j as follows. The probability distribution c a j (e, γ j , a −j , ω) on A j satisfies, for all a j ∈ supp c a j (e, γ j , a −j , ω), γ j (a j )(e) = ψ j (γ j )(e)
and the probability distribution c e (γ j , a −j , ω) on E satisfies c e (γ j , a −j , ω) =c(ψ j (γ j ), a −j , ω).
If principal j deviates to a menu γ j in Γ * j , his payoff becomes V j (γ j ,σ −j , c ) = V j (ψ j (γ j ),σ −j ,c)
because of (13). Because [σ 1 , . . . ,σ J ,c] is an equilibrium relative to A and ψ j (γ j ) ∈ A j , we have V j (σ j ,σ −j ,c) ≥ V j (ψ j (γ j ),σ −j ,c).
Combining (14) and (15) yields V j (σ j ,σ −j ,c) ≥ V j (γ j ,σ −j , c ). Therefore, [σ 1 , . . . ,σ J ,c] is also an equilibrium relative to Γ * and hence the social choice functionπ : Ω → ∆(E × Y ) continues to be supported.
